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“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"  
George Santayana, from "Life of Reason I" 
 
ince the onset of the debt crisis in late 2009, the comparisons between Greece and 
Argentina have multiplied, with an emphasis more on the similarities than the 
differences. This is not surprising given the stunning parallels. This Commentary 
draws a systematic comparison between the two countries over the decade before the crisis 
and the management of the crisis. Overall it suggests that there may be little left to do for 
Greece to avoid a repeat of the Argentine default, but in larger scale. 
A decade of ‘quasi’ monetary union and Monetary Union 
Since early 2010, almost all independent observers have stressed that Greece was facing a 
solvency, and not a liquidity problem. This was also the case ten years ago with Argentina, 
yet in both cases the crisis was addressed as one having a liquidity nature.  
But let us start from the beginning. 
In 1991, in order to achieve inflation stability, Argentina embarked on a radical experiment: 
the currency board. The arrangement consisted of entering into a ‘quasi’ monetary union 
with the US by (almost) replacing the national currency and monetary policy by the US 
dollar and the Federal Reserve policy, respectively. Initially the new arrangement worked 
very well: growth returned and the confidence of foreign investors was such that large 
inflows of foreign direct investment, especially the banking sector, began to materialise. 
Then 10 years later, Greece went through a similar experience: in 2001 it joined the European 
Monetary Union, giving up monetary sovereignty and its own currency with the purpose, 
among others, of curing years of fiscal problems and inflation. For about nine years, the 
balance of the experience was definitely positive: inflation was brought under control and 
significant growth was fuelled by abundant and cheap capital inflows induced by growing 
economic and financial integration within the monetary union.   
For Argentina the problem developed into the 1990s. A series of external shocks (the 
Mexican crisis in 1994, the strong appreciation of the dollar in 1995, the crisis in East Asia in 
1997, the Russian default in 1998 and, most importantly, the currency crisis in Brazil in 1999) 
made the national currency largely overvalued under the hard peg regime to the dollar, 
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external deficits started to emerge in a persistent fashion and growth to slow down. At the 
same time, fiscal imbalances, driven by widespread corruption and rampant public 
expenditure, had become pervasive. By 2000 investors started to worry about future 
developments in the country and the more generally about its solvency; as consequence the 
price of government bonds started to drop (see Figure 1).1  
Similarly to Argentina, the Greek troubles started to emerge on the wave of a large external 
shock. Following the financial crisis of 2008, the risk perception dramatically changed, 
capital flows to Greece reduced and with them growth. Combined with the revelation of 
doctored statistics, the huge public and external debt accumulated after years of fiscal and 
external imbalances, rapidly appeared unsustainable to international investors. As shown in 
Figure 1, yields on bonds issued by the Greek government soared dramatically over a very 
less than one year time. 
Figure 1. Spreads evolution   
 
Note: Greek sovereign spreads are measured relative to 5-yr yield on the German bund. For Argentina Strip 
Spreads are displayed.  
Source: Datastream and Bloomberg. 
Facing the crisis: Fiscal austerity and zero deficit promises 
Despite a public primary balance almost always positive over the 1990s, the stock of public 
debt in Argentina had almost doubled over the decade (from 34% to more than 60% of GDP), 
driven by increasing financing needs to fund off-budget expenditures (mainly recognition of 
pre-existing debt such as overdue obligations to pensioners and suppliers) and current 
expenditures hidden by an opaque fiscal system. Starting from 1999, mostly under the 
pressure of the IMF and the conditionality associated with the three consecutive 
programmes, the government approved a sequence (four in two years) of laws aiming at 
controlling public deficit and restoring market confidence. The last and tougher one, the so- 
called ‘Zero deficit law’ endorsed in July 2001, committed to a balanced budget by the fourth 
quarter of the same year. Regrettably at the end of 2001, the deficit was not zero but it had 
reached 6% of GDP, growth was at -4.5 against the expected +3.5% as foreseen in the 
consolidation plan and violent protests broke out in the streets of the country.  
                                                      
1 At the time the CDS market had not yet developed as a measure of default probability.  
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The current Greek experience with the control of current expenditures is not much different.2 
Since the start of the troubles, the Greek government has proposed and endorsed three 
different consolidation plans. In January 2010 (before the first IMF programme), the newly 
elected Greek government had planned budget reforms aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit 
from 12.9% of GDP to below 3% in 2012. Despite the endorsement of the plan by the 
European Commission, quickly enough the details of plan turned out to be not credible. In 
early May 2010, following the approval of official program with a loan to Greece, the IMF 
designed a more plausible (at least a priori) fiscal consolidation plan aiming at getting a 
general government deficit below 3% by 2014. However, at the time of the third review in 
June 2011, the plan’s intermediate targets were assessed as not being met and the IMF 
conditioned the issuance of the new tranche of payments to the existence of an additional 
emergency plan. As result, the Greek government had to present a new austerity plan of 
€28.6 billion to take effect in 2012-15. The plan was approved on June 29th and it is a pre-
condition for Greece to get a second emergency plan of about €90 billion from euro area 
member states. 
One difference between Argentina and Greece is noteworthy: the latest Greek programme 
includes a large plan of assets sales (officially about €50 billion, but more realistically, it will 
likely less than this sum) as one of the key elements for debt reduction; Argentina could not 
resort to privatisations given that almost all of the state-owned assets had already been sold 
during the 1990s. 
The External Aid: The IMF and the others 
In the case of Argentina, when foreign creditors started to doubt the ability of the country to 
service the debt, the international community responded with large financial support 
packages. In March 2000, the IMF approved a three-year stand-by credit ($7.2 billion) to be 
treated as ‘precautionary’. The programme envisaged a resumption of growth, a decline in 
fiscal deficit and structural reforms. Even if targets were subsequently revised and reduced 
i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e v i e w s ,  n o n e  o f  t h e m  w a s achieved. Given the continuing external 
financing difficulties and the country’s inability to access international capital markets, in 
January 2001, the IMF granted Argentina an augmentation of the stand-by arrangement to 
$13.7 billion. At the same time, additional financing was arranged from official and private 
sources. A total plan of about $40 billion was presented by the Argentine government as the 
blindaje, a shielding system of loans issued (other than the IMF) by the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the government of Spain ,combined with financing 
assurances from the private sector3 that would have protected Argentina against the lack of 
market access.  
However, the failure in meeting fiscal targets (the third IMF review was indeed negative) 
was at the source of persisting troubles and on 7 September 2001, based on Argentina’s 
commitment to implement the Zero Deficit Law immediately, the IMF augmented its first 
agreement for a second time, increasing lending commitment by another $8 billion (to a total 
of about $22 billion). 
                                                      
2 Interestingly enough, in October 2001, Argentinean provinces started to pay public salaries with 
special ‘provincial bonds’; similarly on December 2010 Greece had decided to pay four-fifth of its €6.8 
billon in state hospital arrears to drug-makers through special zero coupon bonds issued by the Greek 
State with two-four years maturity.  
3 The private sector component of the Blindaje was about $20 billion over 5 years. It included the an 
agreement with 12 institutions in Argentina to roll over maturing bonds and purchase new public 
issues for $10 billion, with private pension funds to purchase new public issue for $3 billion and 
liability management operations on international bonds for $7 billion. Interestingly the operations 
were premised on transactions conducted at market price (see IMF, 2004, for more details).  
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Once again the experience of Greece is strikingly similar in frame, but bigger in size. In May 
2010, the IMF and some member states of the European Monetary Union agreed on an 
emergency package to help Greece facing, supposedly, a liquidity problem and imposed a 
tough adjustment programme on Greece aiming at reducing fiscal deficit. Despite the 
Government’s efforts, the intermediate objectives have been missed systematically. Facing a 
concrete risk of default, a new package of about €80 billion4 is under discussion, conditional 
to the endorsement of the new austerity plan.  
Table 1 below summarises the size of the (approved) loans to Argentina and Greece in 
relative terms. 
Table 1. Official Lending 
Country   IMF lending  Total Official Lending 
Argentina  
(2001) 
$22bn 
8% GDP 
$48bn 
17% GDP  
10% External debt  22% External debt 
Greece  
(2011) 
EUR30bn 
13% GDP 
EUR 110bn 
50% GDP 
7% External debt  26% External debt 
Note: External debt is measured as external liabilities (Source IMF) 
Sources: “The IMF and Argentina, Evaluation Report”, 2004; “Greece, Staff report on Request for Stand-By 
Agreement”, 2011; authors’ calculation on IMF data. 
 
It is worth noting that the fact that Greece belongs to a real monetary union gives Greece 
access to another official lender: Greek banks can benefit from the European Central Bank 
refinancing instruments. Thanks to it, they have been able to refinance themselves by about 
€90 billion (40% of GDP) and survive both their insulation in the interbank market and a 
significant deposit flight.  Hence, including all different sources of official lending, Greece 
has already received as much as €200  billion (i.e. more than 80% of its GDP). This is likely to 
increase up to €310 billion over the coming days (following the new European emergency 
plan) and even to a higher amount if deposits flight were to continue and the ECB to provide 
substitute for them (see the section below on the state of deposits). In relative terms, this is a 
much larger financial support than Argentina received. 
The private sector involvement: the voluntary restructuring attempt 
In June 2001, as it became clear that Argentina was unable to grow out of its debt problem, 
the government announced a debt swap5 to try to stabilise debt dynamics. It was a 
voluntary, market-based debt exchange under which short-term debt held by residents was 
exchanged for new debt with longer maturities. It was called the megacanje. Despite the 
success of the operation, which amounted to about $29.5 billion, and the reduced debt 
service that it implied for the period 2001-05, the mega swap did not represent an alternative 
to the default. The implicit annual interest rate on the new debt was more than 17%, well 
above the expected growth rate of the economy and clearly unsustainable. Rating agencies 
did not consider the event as a default trigger but the following month, both S&P and 
Moody’s, downgraded long terms sovereign rating further. The credit event was announced 
in early November, when S&P lowered the rating to selective default (SD), after the 
announcement of a voluntary restructuring of all debt6 and the presentation of an additional 
fiscal package.  
                                                      
4 The package should also include €30 billion in private sector participation. 
5 This is to be framed in the private sector participation envisaged by the Blindaje 
6 In fact the completion of the local-leg of the debt restructuring was announced at the end of 
November 2001, it involved the voluntary exchange of bonds for a face value of $51 billion. The 
second phase of the exchange, supposed to involve external debt, never took place.    
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Like Argentina, the option of a voluntary restructuring is now under examination for Greece. 
Just as we write, at the suggestion of the French government, French banks (who are the 
most exposed to the Greek debt) have put forward a proposal to roll over their short-term 
debt coming due until 2014 (i.e. over the time frame of the second rescue package). Although 
details have not been disclosed, the idea seems to be designed along the lines of the Brady 
bonds experience in the 1990s. It seems that the banks would in effect obtain a combination 
of guarantees for about 50% of the bonds coming due (this might be 30 percentage points in 
cash and 20 percentage points in EFSF or other AAA rated bonds). The remaining 50% 
would be rolled into a 30-year discount bond which banks would presumably be able to hold 
at face value in their banking book. The economic value of these long term bonds at market 
prices would be very low, so that the banks are effectively taking a large ‘mark to market’ 
loss (compared to face value). But those banks that which had already written down their 
holds (e.g. those held in the trading book) would actually record a mark to market gain since 
the combined value of the one half paid in cash/guarantees plus the other half in the 
discount bond might very well be above the current mark to market value of a 3-year bond 
today. The discount bond might foresee some additional earlier payments in case GDP 
growth is stronger than expected.  It would with all likelihood de facto have a junior status, at 
least with respect to official loans. 
The final race for deposits 
In Argentina the situation deteriorated irreversibly and default could not be averted any 
longer when locals started withdrawing deposits. At that point, the ten years of successful 
hard pegging were clearly over. The succession of three IMF programmes of rapidly growing 
size had not prevented the worst scenario: investors were not convinced about debt 
sustainability and the resistance of the population to further adjustments grew along with 
the austerity efforts of the government. On 30 November 2001, the race began: central bank 
reserves fell by $2 billion in one day. In response, President de la Rua imposed a wide range 
of controls on banking and foreign exchange transactions in order to stop a bank run: 
el corallito, which included $1,000 per month limitation on personal bank withdrawals and 
only from account denominated in pesos. Figure 2 shows the behaviour of deposits over the 
24 months that preceded the default and the rebound of the deposits after the corallito was 
introduced. From the comparison of the developments in the Greek deposits with the pattern 
of deposits in Greece over the last 24 months, it emerges that the volatility in the Greek data 
is significantly smaller, but deposits have decreased steadily. 
As mentioned earlier, it should be also taken into account that belonging to a real monetary 
union puts Greece in a much better position than Argentina had, in terms of financing of the 
banking system. If Greece were not in the eurozone (or if the euro area’s monetary policy 
had been structured like that of the US, i.e. working through money centre banks), the 
country’s banking system would have broken down already some time ago.   
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Figure 2. The race to deposits 
 
Note: T-24 is 24 months before the period considered. Argentina T= Dicember ’99. Greece T= April ’09. 
Sources: IMF and Bank of Greece. 
 
History repeating itself: Where are we heading? 
This commentary has emphasised stunning similarities between the experience of Argentina 
and Greece, both in the nature of the crisis and the approach to its management. Table 2 
provides a summary of the timeline with main events for the two countries and the stunning 
parallels.  
Given this background, the question is how should one assess the chances of Greece 
avoiding an Argentine scenario today? A quick look at the economic fundamentals of Greece 
today versus the situation of Argentina before the default is not encouraging.  
Table 2. Timeline of the events 
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
GREECE ARGENTINA
ARGENTINA GREECE 
1991  ‘Quasi monetary’ union with the US  Monetary union with Eurozone  2001 
1994-1999  External shocks: Brazil currency crisis  External shock: Global financial crisis  2008-2010 
1999  De La Rùa becomes President  Papandreou becomes Prime Minister  2009 
June 1999 
Governor Duhalde is reported to 
consider debt restructuring 
Papandreou affirms that Greek 
economy is in “intensive care” 
November 
2009 
September 
2009 
Fiscal Responsibility law to reduce 
government spending  
Papandreou unveils radical reforms to 
cut the deficit 
December 
2009 
February 
2000  
National strike against fiscal and 
labour reforms 
Greek public sector workers strike 
against pension reform and sectoral 
deregulation 
February 
2010 
March 
2000 
IMF plan  IMF plan  May 2010 
May 2000 
The Government announces $1bilion 
in budget cuts 
The government presents draft budget 
containing hard cut to public spending 
October 
2010 
March 
2001 
International rating agencies lower 
Argentina’s long-term sovereign 
rating 
Fitch becomes the third ratings agency 
to cut Greek debt to “junk” status after 
S&P and Moody’s 
February 
2011  
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Table 3 below shows that according to four fundamental indicators of an impending crisis, 
the score is four to nil for Argentina. Greece has had systematically higher public debt, larger 
fiscal and current account deficits and greater external debt, while the pattern for growth 
over the decade of the monetary agreement (1991-2001 for Argentina and 2001-11 for Greece) 
was impressively similar in the two countries (see Figure 3). 
Table 3. Fundamentals. Greece v. Argentina: 4 to 0  
   Argentina 
Average 
1996-2000 
Greece 
Average  
2006-2010 
Argentina 
2001 
Greece 
2011 
Public deficit 
(%GDP) 
-2.9%  -9.5%  6.1%  7.5% 
Public debt 
(% GDP) 
40.1% 118.1% 53.7% 153.1% 
Current 
account 
 (% GDP) 
-3.7%  -12.3%  -1.4%  -8.2% 
Gross external 
debt (% GDP) 
51% 295% 53% 328% 
Note: Data for Greece 2011 are the projections contained in the Third Review under Stand-by 
Agreement, March 2011. 
Source: IMF. 
 
Figure 3. Real GDP growth rate 
 
Source: World Bank 
Note: T is the beginning of the new monetary regime: 1991 for the currency board in Argentina and 
2001 for the monetary union in Greece.  
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
T t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 t+8 t+9 t+10
Greece Argentina
March 
2001 
Domingo Cavallo is appointed  new 
Minister of the Economy 
Reshuffle of government: Evangelos 
Venizelos becomes the new finance 
minister 
June 2011 
July 2011 
Unions calls a nationwide strike to 
protest government austerity plan 
Anti-austerity demonstrators gather 
outside parliament 
June 2011 
June 2001  Completion of the mega-swap 
French banks draft a voluntary private 
sector participation in the plan to help 
Greece 
June 2011 
July 2011 
Argentina Congress passes a “Zero 
Deficit Law”, requiring a balanced 
budget by the 4th quarter of 2001 
Greek parliament approves, with a tiny 
majority, €28.6 billion of extra austerity 
measures  
June 2011  
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So where are we heading? As in Argentina in 2001, the population of Greece seems 
determined today to push the country towards the worst of all options: a disorderly default 
without having implemented first the structural reforms which would allow the country to 
emerge leaner and stronger from this ‘catharsis’.  
In the short-run the behaviour of deposits will make the difference about which scenario will 
materialise: If deposit flight continues or increases, the Argentine scenario becomes more 
and more likely.  
Overall the management of a large fiscal crisis has a crucial political connotation. Avoiding 
the worst scenario for a country as whole requires a collective commitment involving the 
entire political class as well as the whole population. This is ultimately a manifestation of 
social and national cohesion. Unfortunately Argentina dramatically lacked this element. 
Governments fell one after another and social unrest dominated the streets for months. Until 
now, in Greece, the government has managed to stay in power, despite a tiny majority in 
Parliament and a reshuffle of the cabinet in June, but the violent demonstrations against the 
austerity plan prove that social cohesion is low and the lack of support from the opposition 
in the Parliament witnesses also a lack of national union.   
Overall there is very little Europe can do to avoid this outcome. It is often said that history 
repeats itself only as a farce. In the case of Greece, it may look more like a tragedy.   
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